



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L E T T E R

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT, Esq;

On the Present

Negotiations for a P E A C E

W I T H

FRANCE AND SPAIN.

Animum in Vulnere ponunt.

VIRG.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. COOTE, at the King's Arms, in
Pater-Noster-Row. MDCCLXII.

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LETTER, &c.

S I R,

I CAN address you in no terms more proper than those that are sometimes made use of from the throne, *The eyes of all Europe are upon you*; I say of *all Europe*, because the resolutions of the British parliament, in which you have so extensive an influence, will, in a great measure, decide the fate of the public, whether Great Britain shall bend, or endeavour to break the neck of France.

There seems, Sir, to be no medium; she has offered to submit to the former; your friends insist upon the latter; they insist that there is no safety for our Ame-

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rican interests should France be allowed to keep a foot of ground on the continent of North America ; and that we can have no reparation for the expence this war has put us to, but by a total engrossment of the fish and sugar trades. This, Sir, is going rather farther than you yourself went in the negotiation of 1761 ; and therefore I cannot figure to myself a more proper mediator than yourself for allaying those heats, which, if not allayed, may at this time, be fatal to the nation.

If I could, Sir, foresee where our demands would stop, I should by no means be averse to our stretching them to the utmost. When our present disputes with France began we had not in our eye a single object, but the ascertainment of the bounds of Canada. I shall pass no encomiums upon the abilities of the gentlemen who were employed as commissaries for that purpose. They certainly were far from being equal to their commission ; and for want of information, or courage, or both, they gave the French court but too plausible a handle for trifling with the negotia-

negotiation, and even for representing the arguments and facts to be highly in their favour. Their assurance was such, that presuming upon that evident futility and fribblery (pardon the expression) with which the whole negotiation was conducted, they commenced hostilities in North America; and thus ended the prologue and the first act of our political drama.

Our making reprisals, by seizing the French ships without any formal declaration of war, opened the second act, and some very disagreeable incidents, such as the defeat of Braddock, and the taking our forts in America, changed the aspect of the war greatly to our prejudice. I am far from wanting to revive the remembrance of disagreeable events; but it is certain, that the shameful disputes that reigned over all the British interests in America confirmed the obstinacy, and increased the insolence, of the French, while the check that Byng received in the Mediterranean, and the loss of Minorca, seemed to leave amongst us no national spirit.

Such was the gloomy prospect when the curtain drew up for the third act of the drama. All that we then wanted was to secure our back settlements. Security and protection against the encroachments of the French was the ultimatum of our designs. Not a whisper transpired about Canada, and far less about Guadaloupe or Martinico. But the French were incautious enough to unite us by their provocations. Sir William Johnson beat them; they were driven from their encroachments; they lost some of their capital ships, and at last Louisbourg itself fell before the British arms.

Here, Sir, our language was changed; it was not enough that we had secured our back settlements, unless they were defended against all possibility of any future attack; and this brought on the expedition to Canada; which, give me leave to say, and I appeal to the last words of the hero, who conducted it, was the worst concerted but the best executed enterprise that ever was undertaken; for had it not been for a most miraculous concurrence

rence of accidents, the planners of the expedition, instead of being entitled to national honours, must have been covered with public disgrace. But in the fourth act, Sir, I am afraid the laws of the stage were violated, because the unity of place was disregarded; the scene was transferred from America to Germany; but by what magic this transition was made, you Sir, perhaps can best account for. To say, that our operations in Germany facilitated our conquests in America, is flying in the face of common sense. The French had received their mortal blows in America before the German system took place; they had received them during your anti-germanic professions; they were not in a condition to send a single battalion to America, from the time that Louisbourg was taken, to that unfortunate period, when the haughty and offensive behaviour of a certain great minister obliged France and Spain to conclude that family compact, which the same great personage represented to be a measure of danger,

whereas,

whereas, in fact, it was a precaution for self-defence.

Thus we have seen how gradually success has extended our views. Instead of the humble, defensive, and indeed prudent, scheme of ascertaining our boundaries, and defending them from encroachments, we annihilated the Dunkirk of America, and laid an empire in the dust. We thus obtained more than our warmest expectations had reached; we might now have bid defiance to the power of France, nor could the gates of hell have prevailed against our empire in America; but as Pyrrhus said to his minister, *Let us step across the sea; Martinico and Guadeloupe invite our arms.* But give me leave, Sir, to ask, to what part of the original scheme of security for our conquests do those two islands relate; are they not totally foreign to it? They are, it is true, very tempting morsels, and may serve to make our merchants as *kings upon the earth.* Is not this a total deviation from our original plan? To those questions it
has

has been replied, that we could not otherwise have indemnified ourselves for the vast expence the war has cost us. This manner of reasoning puts me in mind of your delicate punch drinkers. The first glass is too weak ; pray add a little more rum to it. — Now it is too strong. — It wants water. — Nay now, indeed, you have made it all water. — Prithee, a little more rum to it. — Thus we go on adding expence upon expence till our views are boundless, and every acquisition induces a necessity for another. We attacked and conquered Martinico and Guadaloupe to indemnify ourselves ; but what indemnifies us for the expences we have been at in those conquests? Must not another conquest be undertaken; and when we have been mad enough to drive the French out of America, at an expence which is twenty times greater than all their property there can satisfy, who is to indemnify us for that?

Let us then attack old France, and let her suffer. Would not this be talking like mad men? But what else can we do,
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if we continue to multiply expences, and consequently indemnifications.

Having said thus much with regard to France, let us turn our eyes to a more important object, I mean Spain. I shall, for argument sake, take it for granted that we succeed before the Havannah; but can that be our ultimate object? Every shilling we acquire at the Havannah goes into private pockets, without a farthing of it being brought to account by the government. Does this ease our landed interest of taxes; does it diminish our payments for window-lights and wheel-carriages; will it take off the duties we pay for every manufacture, and for every ingredient that enters into manufactures; will it abolish the burdens upon coals, soap, salt, candles, leather, and a thousand other articles indispensable to a trading nation; or to sum up the whole, will the plunder of the Havannah contribute towards the fitting out a single ship for its protection, or a single battalion for its defence.

What

What then is the ultimate end of our attempt upon the Havannah, supposing it to be successful? Undoubtedly our having the treasures of Peru and Mexico at our devotion. This idea is too romantic to be farther insisted on. It confutes itself, and were it carried into execution, would in two years undo this country; because it would take from us that spirit of industry, which has given us more wealth than even Peru and Mexico yielded to the Spaniards; and yet without that ridiculous romantic idea our whole proceedings and schemes of accumulating conquests are unaccountable.

But, it may be said, we must have the Havannah to bridle the Spaniards and overawe their insolence. Bridle them from what? From bringing wealth and riches into our own ports. The plain truth, is, that we must either keep the Havannah or give it back. If we keep it, it must be for some farther purpose, as the place itself, intrinsically, even if the whole island is thrown into it, cannot pay the expences of garrisoning it; and the charges of the

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expedition in conquering it. It serves the Spaniards as a noble warehouse and the key of their navigation; and undoubtedly the treasure that may be found in it is immense, but when it is diverted from those purposes, it is of next to no importance to the British nation.

If the plan of our operations do not extend to a total conquest of both the French and Spanish America, our conduct is incomprehensible. Can it be imagined that any people will be hewers of wood and drawers of water for another? Is it in our power to force the Spaniards to dig in the mines of Mexico and Potosi for us; and if they do not, where is the use of our keeping the Havannah? Let us for a moment suppose that place to be in our hands; we should not be possessed of it six months before a national outcry would be made up on the unwholesomeness of the climate, its disagreement with English constitutions, and the immoderate expence of maintaining it. This being the case, another expedition must be set on foot to Lima, perhaps and Vera Cruz,

to bring ourselves home, as the saying is, and thus from expedition to expedition we are encouraged to throw at all, till we become masters of the Spanish continent in America.

I shall, Sir, for argument sake, suppose that desirable period to be arrived, what is the consequence? how are we to hold them? Is this nation like the Heruli, the Goths and the Vandals of former times, overstocked with inhabitants? Are we in a capacity to send out our millions to make new conquests; and to people new colonies; and how many millions must we send out before the conquests I speak of could be of service to us to overawe a proud exasperated people, heated with revenge, and animated by despair. Now that I am upon this subject, Sir, I hope you will not take it amiss, if I just express my apprehensions, that we have already gained more conquests than we can make use of to any good purpose. For my own part, considering the nature of the capitulation of Guadeloupe and Martinico, I can by no means discover the infinite advan-

tage either of them can be of to the inhabitants of Great Britain. The French are in possession of their properties; they are entitled to the return of their labours; they trade under our protection; they are exempted from many heavy burdens and oppressive taxes they paid to their former masters, and we need not doubt of their retaining at all times French hearts, sentiments, and manners.

But, it may be said, they will take off great quantities of our manufactures, they will employ our shipping, and we shall have the exclusive trade of sugar. As to our manufactures; I believe the difference in their demand, or rather in their consumption, will be very inconsiderable, compared to what it was before we conquered those islands. English manufactures will make their way, and find their vent everywhere even amongst enemies. We may guess pretty shrewdly at the efforts of prohibitions, by what we experience in our own country; for I cannot perceive, that there is the smallest diminution of the consumption of French commodities amongst us

us since the beginning of this war, but in those articles in which our manufactures exceed those of the French. As to the employment of our shipping, and consequently the encrease of our navigation, I own myself to be a little singular on that head. Supposing 80,000 hogshheads of sugar to be annually manufactured in both islands, the whole amounts to no more than 20,000 tons, which at a medium may employ 150 ships. This, it must be admitted, would be a considerable encrease in our shipping, if the case was not that our sugar ships from Barbadoes, Jamaica, and our other islands, are, one with another, seldom above half loaded; and to make up the deficiency, as they undoubtedly will do by loading Guadaloupe sugars, the encrease of shipping will be but very trifling, when put in competition with the benefits of peace. With regard to the last advantage proposed, I mean the exclusive sugar trade, it is a mere chimæra, while the French and Spaniards are in possession of Hispaniola, and so many other places
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and island where sugars almost spontaneously grow.

But, Sir, nothing would be more amazing to me than to understand, that any of your West-India friends, of whom you have great numbers, should clamour against a peace that is to restore Guadeloupe and Martinico to the French. Should Great Britain avail herself to the utmost by the cultivation of sugars in those islands, to what a state, in a few years, must our old original islands be reduced! Supposing that our shipping is encreased by the acquisition of those two islands, what do we gain, if it is at the expence of our other islands? But, Sir, I am in no pain about that consideration; perhaps the danger they have escaped may quicken them to a degree of industry, that may more than compensate for giving back the two islands in question. Upon the whole, therefore, I can by no means be satisfied, that our retention of those islands would at any rate answer the expence of continuing the war; and that it might not in a short time be attended with the detriment, if not the utter

ter ruin of our own islands, which have hitherto brought, and daily brings in, immense riches to this kingdom.

I shall now, Sir, proceed to the fifth act of our drama, which is to usher in the grand catastrophe; and it opens with our conquest of Martinico; a glory for which your friends say we are indebted to your administration. But the consequence of that conquest has been already discussed under the head of Guadaloupe; I shall therefore only add, that it is unanimously agreed amongst all people in trade, that, however brilliant the conquest of Martinico was, it is attended with no solid advantage to this nation, if we consider it separately from Guadaloupe. You, Sir, was willing to give up the kernel, and what shall we do with the shell? You agreed to restore Guadaloupe by the sixth article of the answer you sent to the ultimatum of France, dated Sept. 1, 1761; and indeed, if we seriously canvass the whole of that negotiation, it does not appear to me, that we were to have the smallest compensation for that cession, unless

less we suppose the demolition of Dunkirk, and the rendition of Minorca, to be such. As to Dunkirk, I think it is entirely out of the question; the demolition of it was stipulated by former treaties; nor do I see why it should be an object of terror to us in its present condition. As to Minorca, at the time when you offered to cede Guadaloupe, it was so far from being of service to us, that it must have entailed on us a most monstrous useless expence. At present, the case is altered by the family compact, and by our war with Spain, which renders the possession of that island now extremely desirable. But, Sir, it would, I believe, puzzle the best of your friends to name any one disadvantage, which the loss of Minorca put us under before the war with Spain broke out, but that of freeing us from an expence of above 200,000 l. a-year, in maintaining three thousand men in garrison, not to mention our immense charge in shipping, in transporting troops, ammunition, and provisions to and from the island, and the costs of fortifications and repairs, which at a moderate

moderate computation may be estimated at 100,000 l. a-year more. I shall finish this head with one observation; which is, that no acquisition can be so valuable to the acquirer, as it was to the original owner. Martinico could not have cost us less than seven thousand men to garrison it, and keep the inhabitants in awe. The French were free of that expence, all but the trifle they paid to the officers for disciplining their men, which were raised upon that and the neighbouring islands.

What I have observed, with regard to the rendition of Guadaloupe, is applicable to the liberty which the French, by the ensuing treaty, are to have of fishing in the gulph of St. Laurence. You, Sir, agree that they should have a port there without fortifications to be subject to the inspection of England, you have granted the French subjects the privilege of fishing in the gulph of St. Laurence, upon this express condition, that is to say; That the said French subjects shall abstain from that particular fishery on all the coasts appertaining to Great Britain, whether on

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the continent, or on the islands situated in the said gulph of St. Laurence, which fishery the proprietors only of the said coasts have constantly enjoyed, and always exercised; saving always the privilege granted by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, to the subjects of France to fish and dry their cod fish, on a part specified on the banks of Newfoundland. You likewise, Sir, consented in your master's name to cede to the French king the isle of St. Pierre, which is divided by a little streight from another island, known by the name of Miquelon, or Michelon, lying to the north, which isle of St. Pierre with its port, with respect to that part of Newfoundland situate between the bay of Placentia, and the bay of La Fortune, stands east south east, and its port opens towards the north east, the interior part of which port is called Bourgway.

To the cession of the said isle the following conditions were annexed: That France, on no pretence, nor under any denomination whatever, shall erect any fortifications, either in the said isle, or in
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its port, and that she shall not keep any troops there, nor maintain any military establishment whatever. That the said isle, and the said port, shall only serve as a shelter for the fishing vessels of the French nation, and that France shall not suffer the vessels of any other nation whatever to partake of the convenience of this shelter for the fishing boats. That the possession of the isle of St. Pierre as aforesaid, shall not be construed in any case to confer, transmit, or participate in any manner whatever, the least right or power of fishing, or of drying cod fish, in any part of the coast of Newfoundland, beyond the district expressly stipulated and fixed for that purpose, by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, that is to say, *A loco Cap Bonavista nuncupato, usque ad extremitatem ejusdem insulæ septentrionalem, indeque ad latus occidentale recurrendo usque ad lacum Pointriche appellatum.* By the succeeding article, an English commissary was to be allowed to reside on that island, and the commander of the British squadron at Newfoundland to be at liberty from time

to time to inspect the said isle and the said port, to see that the stipulations above expressed were punctually observed.

I have, Sir, been the more explicit with regard to those terms, because it is very possible that by this time they are forgotten by the public. It is evident that they are founded upon the treaty of Utrecht, and it is extremely plain, than that if France shall presume to trifle with us, and to make a wrong use of the indulgence there granted, which is the common argument with the enemies of peace, nothing can be more easy than for us to annihilate the same. As the terms of the preliminaries are not yet published, I am not at liberty to say, whether we have, or have not, admitted of the above stipulations, and whether the number of ships to be employed in this fishery are not restricted to a certain number. In the mean time, it may not be impertinent to observe, that by this cession we give up nothing that properly belongs to ourselves, and all we do is to reduce the treaty of Utrecht to its primary meaning, without departing

departing in one tittle from the original principles, upon which we undertook the war. The great question therefore is, whether the giving the French a right to the *feræ naturæ*, a privilege that is not denied even by our lords of the manors, jealous as they are of the game, is of such consequence, as to perpetuate a war. You yourself, Sir, appear plainly to be of opinion that it is not; you thought it inhuman to deprive the French of a privilege, without which, as a people, they cannot subsist.

Thus far, Sir, I have by the help of your polar star, cleared my way, and shewn that we have in reality given up nothing that you yourself would not have given up, had Martinico been in our possession on the 17th of August, 1761. It remains then to enquire, whether we have not gained by the new preliminaries, supposing them to be such as we have in print.

The capital maxim of your negotiation evidently was to secure Canada, and to that security you was willing to sacrifice Guadaloupe, to which Martinico, however

ever we may boast of its importance, is no more than the citadel. But you cannot, Sir, be ignorant of the heart-burnings, the doubts, and difficulties that arose upon your leaving them in possession of Louisiana, even supposing the Marquis de Vandreuil's description of Ganada had taken place, as mentioned in the 2d article of the answer of the British court to the ultimatum of that of France. You may remember, Sir, how copiously your friends declaimed upon the happy riddance you met with on that account. Were I to specify the numerous pamphlets and papers that had been published by them, upon the unfitness and danger of leaving the French in possession of Louisiana, they could appear within these six months to amount to 83. The strong argument urged against it, was, the restless encroaching spirit of the French, the arts of their emissaries, and their great interest amongst the savages, whom they would be perpetually stirring up against our friends and planters, and some of your advocates, or rather the enemies of peace, amongst whom I could

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particularly name, some of your capital writers, have within these six weeks, again and again declared, that we had better yield up Martinico and Guadaloupe, with all the neutral islands, than leave Louisiana in the possession of the French. They have even gone so far as to think, that the entire cession of Canada was of no importance, unless we annexed Louisiana to it. The conveniencies of its rivers, the fertility of its vallies, and its abounding with all kinds of materials for trade and manufactures, have been set forth, Sir, in so oratorical a manner, that I have been sometimes tempted to think, that you yourself was the penman.

How quickly was the strain altered, when it became next to certain, that Louisiana was to be ceded to us ; all its beauties vanished at once, and left nothing behind them, but uncultivated vallies and dreary mountains. In short, Sir, such is the temper of one set of people at this time, that if the French would send us a *carte blanche*, on which we were to write our own terms, I don't believe that five men of the whole

whole party could agree about them. Even your authority, Sir, which our minister has copied by giving up Guadaloupe, is despised and rejected ; and if there is a point in which they are agreed, it is to make the terms of peace as inadmissible as possible to France ; or rather to reject all terms.

I am as prepossessed as any man ought reasonably to be, in favour both of the cause and courage of Britons ; and I seriously think, that at present we are superior to the French in the practical part of war, both by sea and land. I can however by no means admit that superiority to be fixed and permanent. Your own friends, Sir, produce a strong evidence that it is not. According to them, when you took into your hand the steerage of state, the French were to us what we are now to them. They beat us in every quarter, and triumphed over us on both elements. I dare not, Sir, flatter you so far, as to say that it was your eloquence and measures alone that roused us from our despondency. The former was seldom heard beyond
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the walls of a certain chappel, and the latter on your outsetting were certainly worst judged than any of those of your predecessors, witness the two generals to whom you gave the command of the two most important expeditions in the whole war, I mean that against Guadaloupe, and that against Rochfort. Both of them miscarried in a most unaccountable, not to say scandalous, manner, and yet, Sir, you escaped the blame of both; so partial was the public in your favour, or so callous were we grown that we did not feel disgrace. All sensation however had not forsaken us; and you had the good fortune to preside at the cabinet, just at the time when we were putting off the old man and putting on the new; or, to speak without a metaphor, when it was plain to his late Majesty and the other ministers that the nation could no longer suffer the drones of corruption, and the veterans of iniquity, who had long done every thing but fight for their pay, to engross the national service. Such was the happy crisis, which we may call the turn of the tide

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our affairs, which you took advantage of, and monopolized the merit of it to yourself. Notwithstanding your unfortunate choice of the St. Cas commander, to you was ascribed the education, the spirit and success of a Wolfe, a Barrington and a Monckton; tho', God knows, it requires but a very small portion, either of reading, experience, or common sense, to be convinced, that generals of their age are the most proper to carry such services, as they performed, into execution.

But, Sir, upon what principle of common sense or justice are we to conclude, either that the operations of the war, or the choice of the generals, were directed by you? I have indeed admitted that they were, in the same sense as Lewis XIV. was complimented on the actions of a Turenne, a Condé, or a Luxembourg; but I can by no means figure to myself, that you had the smallest exclusive privilege of appointing generals, or that you did any more than fall in with the general bent and opinion of his Majesty, and your fellow counsellors.

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But, say your admirers, the plan of the measures was yours, your intelligence was exact, precise, and extensive, and there wanted nothing but address and courage to carry your measures into execution. These are encomiums I have heard lavished upon you in every coffee-house, and every corner of a coffee-house ; our city halls, and even our churches have resounded with your praise ; and yet, when we come to what we call close quarters, with how little foundation ! Your intelligence with regard to the situation and state of Quebec was so precise and exact, that general Wolfe was as much at a loss when he came into that river, as he must have been, had he arrived on the banks of Styx without a Charon to ferry him over. He succeeded, it is true, by one of those very few miracles that are recorded in history ; but can the most frontless of your admirers who reads his last letter to yourself, pretend that he succeeded by your directions, by your foresight, or by your dispositions ? Had he not succeeded, was you not more liable to an impeachment than the Earl

of Oxford was, when one of the charges against him was, not for advising, but, for not presenting so hair-brained an expedition against the very same place. To prove what I say, let us look into the 17th article of his impeachment, which runs thus, because “ He had not (as prime minister) advised the Queen against the “ destructive expedition to Canada.” With regard to your intelligence at Guadaloupe, it was so excessively exact, that had the French delayed signing the capitulation half an hour longer, the conquest must have been snatched out of our hands by a superior force ; and yet this is the minister who filled our enemy’s ports, armies, and navies with his spies, and who had intelligence of what was doing even at their council-boards. With regard to Martinico, I shall be silent, because I do not perceive, either that the conquests was made under your auspices, or that the French were at any pains to defend it, after they had lost Guadaloupe. With regard to the conquest of Belleisle, it was your plan, and your’s only, and long may the laurels

laurels flourish which you gained by the acquisition. None, I dare to say, will attempt to tear them from your temples ; it was an exploit that rivals the most glorious in antiquity ; for I can put none in competition with it, but the famous expedition of Caligula, who, after being at an immense expence in his preparations, marched to the sea-side, and ordering his soldiers to fill their helmets with cockle-shells and periwinkles, demanded triumphal honours for returning with the spoils of the ocean. This is a subject however that is rather too serious to be treated ludicrously. The expence of Caligula's expedition came out of his own pocket ; that of the Belleisle expedition was defrayed by a people already overburdened with debt. Caligula's conquest was bloodless ; your's, was attended with the loss of many brave men's lives ; his, rendered him the mock of the people of Rome ; your's, made you the idol of the mob of England.

Your friends, Sir, pretend to excuse so shameless a misapplication, so wanton a prostitution of national power, and national

onal treasure, by pretending that the armament employed against Belleisle was by you intended for another object, that rather than that it should be totally unemployed it was sent against that island.

Two considerations arise from this apology ; the first is to the total discredit of that intelligence and foresight, assigned you by your admirers, as well as your all-directing power in the cabinet. The other consideration has a much worse aspect. If you found, Sir, at the time the expedition against Belleisle was undertaken, that your interest in the cabinet was not strong enough to have directed the armament to its first object, why did you not *then* resign the seals, *because you could no longer direct the measures of government ?* You are, perhaps, the first minister in England that ever presumed so far upon an all-engrossing power in the administration, as to disdain to sound the sentiments of your fellow ministers, or even your fellow counsellors, with regard to the proper object of so important an armament. Why, Sir, did you not, before the equipment was made,

made, consult the judgment of the rest of the administration; and had you found it averse to any violent measures with Spain, because matters between the two crowns were not ripe for action, why did you not prevent the nation from being put to a most enormous needless expence? Before the expedition (I had almost called it the fatal one) against Belleisle was undertaken, would it not have been becoming a minister of your penetration, to have informed yourself with the utmost precision of the danger, the advantages, the expence, and the consequences of such an undertaking? Instead of that, nothing was to be heard of but that Belleisle was provided with a road, in which all the navy of England could ride; and when taken, was possessed of advantages to which all the power of France must submit. The public was so far imposed upon by such misrepresentations, that our cannons thundered, and our bonfires blazed for an event, that, considering the expence of men and money it cost us, ought to have filled us with shame, and covered us with confusion. Our ships
were

were without shelter, our garrisons without support, our troops without cloathing, and our fellow subjects without sustenance upon a bare comfortless beach, which equals the horrors of any described by the most dismal traveller. That I may not seem to exaggerate, give me leave to observe, that by the 6th article of the ultimatum of France, in reply to that of England, the French are willing to give up to the English the island of Belleisle, without even making a handle of reclaiming it, as being a conquest made after the proposition of *uti possidetis* had been settled. This concession from a people, who never failed to snatch at all advantages, is a full proof in what a light this conquest was held by the French themselves.

The other consideration, Sir, which presents itself on this head is, as I have said, of still worse aspect, because it implies not only imprudence, but inhumanity. The equipment had been made, and rather than it should not be employed, it was employed in giving your city friends a holiday, at the expence of almost a million of
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of money, and the blood of many hundred of our fellow subjects. Thus, Sir, after your mighty projection had blown into air, your had the pleasure of giving your grocers, your tobacconists, and your other Abel Druggers, the comfort to understand, that there was as much of the mighty apparatus still left at the bottom of the pot, as would serve to *cure the itch*.

I shall now, Sir, take the liberty to examine your administration by a light, in which, I think, it has not yet been considered. But to do that, I must appeal to the memories of your friends, and indeed to the testimony of the public. I never heard your warmest advocates, either in speaking or writing, deny that you set out in the beginning of the present war upon professed anticontinental principles. You yourself, Sir, again and again owned that you did, and the fact is yet uncontradicted, while the only apology which you and your friends can make, for so glaring an inconsistency, is that you acted according to the best of your judgment, but that you saw you had reason

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to alter your system : and thus, like another pontiff in politics, you appealed from the pope ill-informed to the pope well-informed, *à patre malè informato ad patrem meliùs informatum*. I should, Sir, readily admit of your plea, especially as I think, that no pope, either pontifical or political, is infallible, had I reason for believing, that you did not originally set out in your administration with a predetermination to carry on the war, as you afterwards did, by plunging us in the abyss of continental connexions, bloodshed and dissipation. I speak it, Sir, with the utmost regard for the memory of that august head, whose grey hairs went with so much honour to the grave, when, I say, that he had a natural, and (when it was properly confined) a laudable, prepossession in favour of his electoral dominions and native country. In this he was encouraged by the system of that ballance of power, which, till it was broken by you, it was our natural interest to support ; but after you broke it, it was the worst of madness in us to attempt to retrieve.

retrieve. His late Majesty, however, warm his affections might be for Hanover, never ventured to push them farther than he thought the principles of public liberty could admit of, till you, Sir, endeavoured to make him sensible, that the balance of power was a chimera; that Britain was a match for all Europe besides; and that, with ancient pistol on her side, she might defy the devil and all his works. This was a new doctrine to a king of Great Britain, who till then had always found the limit of his natural affection prescribed, even by his warmest ministers, with a *Thus, and no farther shalt thou proceed.*

Gentlemen may remember how often your friends boasted, even before your preferment to the seals was absolutely resolved on, that his late Majesty often declared, he never had a minister whom he perfectly understood but you. The meaning of those words came soon to be explained. Instead of displaying your scheme at once, you gave us every year *more last words* from the throne. The immense sums of eight

or ten millions lavished on continental connexions, exclusive of the expences of our sea war, were to be continued but for one year. Another year brings about the same demands, and those were to be the last; but at last we were fairly told, that the more we granted every year, the nearer we were to the period of our expences. I should not have taken notice of those facts, did they not afford us an incontrovertible evidence how far his Majesty was imposed upon, and how artfully he was diverted from following his own inclinations, in restoring peace to the continent of Europe; in the stile of those quacks, who give a favourable interpretation to every fatal turn which their poison brings upon a patient, till, at last, he *dies of good symptoms*.

All your arts however, Sir, could not stifle in his Majesty's breast the dictates of common sense; or, which is the same thing, humanity. I shall not here take upon me to dispute, that the distress, to which the electorate of Hanover was reduced in the year 1757, when the convention

vention of Closterseven was concluded, must have been disagreeable to his late Majesty. But, Sir, it was far from being disgraceful; it was far from being fatal to the liberties of Germany, or even to the interests of that electorate. His Majesty viewed it in that light. He was not the first prince of the foremost rank in history, who had, through superior force, and prudential considerations submitted to the times. He knew it was ridiculous for the French to imagine that they could retain the possession of Hanover, and he considered it as a deposit, till it should be restored to him by the return of peace. His R. H. had the same wise moderate sentiments, and intimated to the Duke de Richelieu, as if a neutrality for Hanover might be desirable; and the proposal was backed by the royal authority. Happy had it been for Great Britain, and even for his Prussian Majesty himself, notwithstanding the many miraculous events which afterwards fell out in his favour, had those wise moderate counsels prevailed; but their success were incompatible with your scheme.

You

You represented the power and riches of this nation as being inexhaustible; and capable of buoying up the electorate of Hanover, tho' thrown into floods of affliction, and, to use your own expression, with a *milstone about her neck*.

That this was your way of reasoning, appears from facts that speak for themselves. Who was it, Sir, that gave his Prussian Majesty information of such a negotiation being on foot? who advised him to send the famous reproaching letter to his uncle, upbraiding him——with what?——with an intention of consulting the good of his electoral, as well as regal dominions, and even with indecent insinuations against his Majesty's person and honour. This letter, it is true, was disclaimed at the court of Prussia, when the writer of it found that he had done wrong in suffering it to go abroad; and when he perceived that the British minister had gained such an ascendant in his master's councils, that there was no danger of his Majesty's insisting upon the Hanover neutrality. No formal disavowal of the letter however
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was ever published by the authority of the English government, but in a counter declaration emitted in the same month of September, his Majesty's electoral ministers, conscious that such a letter was written, use the following expressions. "In such a critical situation, whatever might have been the success of arms, his Majesty is determined steadily to concur with the King of Prussia in the most efficacious measures, for disappointing the iniquities and oppressive designs of their common enemies; and the King of Prussia may assure himself, that the crown of Great Britain will continue religiously to fulfil its engagements with his Prussian Majesty, and support him with vigour and constancy."

Now, Sir, you yourself, who have been in parliament for almost thirty years, and who, I dare to say, has studied the English constitution with the utmost precision, must be sensible, that a British minister is accountable for all the political acts of the king; and if I mistake not, it was upon that very principle of safety, that you
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plausibly pretended to resign the seals of your office. I shall therefore make bold to trouble you with one or two queries, which arise from facts well known to all the world. In the first place, Sir, what were those engagements with the King of Prussia, which his Britannic Majesty was resolved steadily to fulfil? I know of none but a convention, which was from time to time renewed, from the 16th of January, 1756, to the 11th of April, 1757, and the 7th of December the same year, and again renewed on the 9th of November, 1759; by which his Prussian Majesty was to receive 670,000 l. on condition of his augmenting his forces, so as to act in the most advantageous manner for the common cause. By the 4th article of the same treaty, "Their high contracting parties moreover engage, viz. on the one part his Britannic Majesty, both as king, and as elector; and on the other part his Prussian Majesty, not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention whatsoever, with the powers who have taken part in the
present

present war, but in concert; and by mutual consenting, and expressly comprehending each other therein."

Now, Sir, you and your friends shall have the choice of your weapons. You will not surely pretend, that the stipulation for the subsidy was otherwise than annual. Had it been meant for a term of years, it must have been declared to have been so in the same manner, as has been usual with our other subsidiary powers; such as Denmark, Hesse Cassel, Hanover itself, and Russia. I will allow, that the largeness of the sum might have made us a little cautious with regard to the limitations of the time; but that, Sir, I think is the strongest reason that can be adduced against such continuance, unless the purposes answered the expence.

I am aware of a quibble that has been thrown out by your friends, and those of continental connexions, as if the reciprocity of the terms of neither party making peace without consent of the other, was to be perpetual, though the subsidy was

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to be but annual. This argument, Sir, flies in the face of common sense. The convention is plainly for a subsidy, and the condition annexed most certainly determines with the payment of that subsidy; and is no farther binding, than for the time the subsidy is paid. But granting there was any thing in this argument, (the most shameful surely that ever was, though great consequences depend on it) how can it account for our continuing our expensive engagement for one year after the pecuniary stipulation was satisfied. I can perceive in the convention nothing that we was to furnish the king of Prussia with but money; nor can I find any one article stipulated in our favour, but his obligation to receive that money. Had we withdrawn the payment, what must have become of the convention. But the absurdity does not end here.

Pray, Sir, what was Great Britain to have in return for this immense subsidy, or what advantages were she to reap from the engagement of his Prussian majesty, stipulated in the third article for
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augmenting his forces? Were the forces to be employed against the enemies of Great Britain? No such thing is pretended; then to what purpose were they to be employed? Against the enemies of Prussia, or, if your please, Sir, the enemies of that very electorate, which might have been neutral, had it not been for the rage of a certain person, for engrossing power at the expence not only of good policy, but of common humanity.

After ages will have difficulty to believe, that this nation could for seven years submit to pay an annual subsidy, the whole amounting to four millions six hundred ninety thousand pounds, without our receicing from it the smallest compensation in trade, in territory, or in honour. But even this is not all; we filled the fields of Germany with our armies, while our own fields were lying uncultivated for want of hands; and since our first fatal embarkation for that continent, we have, without any visible British purpose, buried more men, and spent more money, than, if rightly applied, would have left us no-

thing more to fear, and hardly more to hope for, in any part of the world. You and your friends, Sir, I know pretend, that the general interest of Europe required our taking a share in the German war, and our supporting the king of Prussia. I admit it; but that concern and that support ought to have been bounded by reason. We were, by still stronger ties, obliged to assist Hanover, while Hanover could be assisted; but were we obliged to pluck her up by the locks from floods of perdition, at the hazard of ourselves sinking along with her?

In fact, Sir, the whole system of the German war, so far as Great Britain was concerned in it, was begun and continued upon wrong principles. The convention between his Prussian majesty and us has nothing in it that answers the title; it evidently is a convention between two foreign powers, without the least regard to the concerns of Great Britain; nor can I figure to myself the smallest advantage we could have reaped from it, tho' all its purposes had been fully answered,
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farther than to have reinstated Hanover in the condition she was in when our war with France broke out, and to have defended Silesia for his Prussian majesty. As to Hanover, nothing can be more certain, than that a neutrality was offered her again and again by the court of France, and the rejecting that neutrality annihilated her importance in the empire; so that all she now retains is a mere phantom of independency, without money, without means, and without nerves to support it: insomuch that, for these three years past, Hanover can scarcely be said to have been an object of the French arms. Those calamities, Sir, are owing to your policy, which prevented her embracing neutrality, that, though attended, perhaps, with some inconveniencies, would have left her, upon the whole, no worse at least than we found her.

With regard to his Prussian majesty, notwithstanding all the pains he has taken in his adduction of proofs, that there was a settled plan formed against him by the house of Austria, the empress of Russia,

sia, and the elector of Saxony ; yet I cannot perceive, that the public is at all agreed as to the justice of his irruption into Saxony. It is well known, that his late Majesty loudly disapproved of it, till your politics, Sir, found means to reconcile it to common justice, and to obliterate in his royal mind the remembrance of all the gross insults, which that monarch at a certain time offered to his person, both as king and elector.

But, Sir, what dreadful consequence could have happened to Great Britain, or the ballance of power in Germany, had his Prussian Majesty even lost Silesia ? It is true, we were obliged to guaranty the possession of it to him ; but that guaranty was forced upon his late Majesty to save the house of Austria from perdition ; neither ought it ever to have operated in a case of offence ; all guaranties being in their own nature merely defensive. Let us therefore suppose, for argument sake, that when the tide of success turned against his Prussian Majesty after the battle of Colin, that her Hungarian Majesty had
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been suffered to repossess herself of Silesia. What fundamental revolution must that have introduced in the system of Europe? Was public liberty more endangered by the house of Austria (who had possessed that dutchy for ages) regaining it, than by the house of Brandenburg retaining it? Or was the difference worth five millions sterling to Great Britain? Did we ever feel any bad effects arising to us by Silesia being in the hands of the house of Austria? Did we ever feel any good ones by its being in those of the house of Brandenburg?

It appears, Sir, from his Prussian Majesty's letter, which I have already mentioned, and which never was contradicted by the court of London, nor by the courts of Berlin or Hanover, till after the Hanoverians had resolved to resume their arms, and to break through the convention of Closterleiven, that his Prussian Majesty was encouraged by the British ministry to break off his connexions with France. But were there no authenticity in that letter, the matter of fact is notorious, and that our
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magnificent promises induced that monarch to abandon his natural connexions with France, for so I must call them, in opposition to the house of Austria. Now, Sir, let us a little consider in what manner the system of Germany must have been affected, had Prussia and France remained united. We cannot with any shew of common sense pretend, that if the Queen of Hungary and her allies, as his Prussian Majesty strenuously contends for, formed a deep, resolute, plan, for stripping Prussia of Silesia, there ever could have been a conjunction between the houses of Bourbon and Austria; no, Sir, that conjunction was formed by the magnificent promises that clenched our alliance with his Prussian Majesty. If then our real design was to have preserved him in possession of Silesia, we took the worst way in the world to effect it, by detaching him from a natural ally, who could cheaply and effectually have served him; and by taking upon ourselves a burden, under which we have staggered ever since, and which must have been totally ineffectual, had it not been

been for the accidental event of the late Czarina's death.

It is admitted, that France attacked Hanover on account of her American quarrel with us; but it is next to certain, that had it not been for our alliance with Prussia, Hanover must have been defended by the house of Austria, the Czarina, and the princes of the empire, who have been since confederated against her. Your intelligence, Sir, I am afraid was very defective, if you imagined that his Prussian Majesty's alliance was any great acquisition to Great Britain, after he was detached from France. He was conscious that he was then totally undone without our subsidy, and without our army to support him. This I believe was more than you either knew or suspected. But his Russian Majesty was in the secret; he knew the connexions, personal as well as political, that subsisted between the two empresses, and he knew at the same time, that they were indissoluble. The event justified his foresight; and in fact, we abandoned the defence of Hanover for that of Prussia.

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What was France to do upon her losing the only natural ally she had in the empire, but to look out for others who would support her in her quarrel against Great Britain? She presumed; and she presumed rightly, that we would make the quarrel of Hanover our own; and she proceeded on a plan, that evinced she was resolved to make no distinction between the King of Great Britain and the elector of Hanover. This, Sir, ought, instead of engaging us wholly in the support of Hanover, to have been our strongest inducement to have left it to the house of Austria and the princes of the empire, as it most certainly would have been, had not Prussia been our ally. In that case, the war between the two houses of Austria and Brandenburg might indeed have gone on, but it never could have affected either Great Britain or Hanover, nor had it not been for the conjunction between us and his Prussian Majesty, could it ever have entered into the heads of the two empresses, or their allies, to have given up Hanover.

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This conjunction reversed the true interests of Hanover, as it drew from her a protection, under which she must have been safe against all the power of France, and gave her an ally who could not support himself; not to mention the effusion of blood and treasure, by our carrying over, supporting, maintaining, and recruiting five and twenty thousand British troops in Germany. When I say this, Sir, I would not be understood as if I meant that Great Britain ought not to have contributed, and that largely too, to the defence of Hanover, I mean in money, but to use your own expression, *not by sending a single battallion out of this country.*

This naturally brings me to examine the reasons, you and your friends have given for your altering so totally, as you did, the plan of your conduct. A certain French nobleman, who is now at this court, can (if he pleases) tell you how extremely desirous his Prussian Majesty, at the beginning of this war, was, to retain the friendship of France. He even made a merit of transmitting to the French court a de-

claration, that he “ flattered himself with having done the King of France a most distinguished service, in detaching Austria from the alliance of England, that, so far from cramping his most Christian Majesty’s operations against the English, he has procured him a greater facility to push them with vigour, by stopping the Russians, their common enemies. His Christian Majesty has therefore nothing to do, but to alter his project of carrying the war into the electorate of Hanover; a change in the plan of his military operations, so much the more easy, for that the guarantee of the Low Countries was not included in that of the electorate.”

This, give me leave, Sir, to say it, was an honest and a sensible declaration, when we consider his Prussian Majesty in the light of a German patriot, zealous for the independency of his country, and for shutting the doors of it in the teeth of all invaders. But in what light must it appear to a British patriot? His Prussian Majesty had a deep inveterate quarrel with the house of Austria, and he knew it to be irreconcilable

reconcilable by all the powers of negotiation. It was therefore his interest to break the connexions between the house of Austria and Great Britain, its principal support, and thereby he served both his most Christian Majesty and himself. The Duke de Nivernois, Sir, is not insensible that this plan of his Prussian Majesty, when he returned from his embassy at Berlin, was far from being disrelished at the court of France, and had it been thoroughly adopted, the continent of Europe, long before this time must have been in a state of tranquility, but that was not the view of your administration. His Prussian Majesty must be tempted by a subsidy greater than all the rest of his revenues, to fall upon the house of Austria; an undertaking highly agreeable both to his inclination and interest, tho' it is perhaps impossible to reconcile it to ours. From that instant he abandoned his former system, and obliged France and Austria to coalesce. By this conduct, Hanover was deprived of its natural protectors, and Great Britain was
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saddled with the whole expence, danger, and loss of defending it.

But we are, all this time, it seems, reasoning in the dark. You had a deeper scheme in the tergiversation of your maxims, for you perceived by experience, that America only could be conquered in Germany. Ridiculous as this apology is for your apostacy, it has been so warmly adopted, and urged by you and your advocates, that I shall treat it with some degree of serious consideration. Which was the most important object, Sir, to the French; the more than doubtful recovery of the electorate of Hanover, already exhausted, impoverished and pillaged; defended by seventy thousand men, five and twenty thousand of whom were English, and by still more powerful enemies, cold and hunger, or the defence of their possessions in America, and the West Indies? Had the French entertained the smallest hope, of being able to repair the first blows with which we gave their marine there, could any thing in Germany, have been an object for employing

ploying their arms? But let us examine facts in their natural order.

In the beginning of the years 1755, the French sent off from Brest to America, all the forces that they had shipping to carry; and they were sufficient for disappointing, that year, our projected expedition against fort du Quesne. We succeeded however, June the 16th, against the French fort at Beaufejour, and all Nova Scotia fell into our hands. We likewise defeated, September the 7th, the French general Dieskau, tho' we failed in our design against Crown Point through the lateness of the season, and Braddock was defeated and killed, July the 9th. By this time, viz. June 10th, the admirals Boscawen and Mostyn, who had been sent with a squadron to intercept a fresh embarkation of the enemy's troops, took two French men of war of the line, on the coast of America. These, Sir, are events that did not properly fall under what is called your administration, tho' they are immediately connected with those that did, and to which I shall now pass.

You

You was on the 27th of June, 1757, restored to the seals, and you was heard more than once, to express your approbation of Lord Loudon being appointed to the command of the land forces, and admiral Holbourne to those of the sea, that were sent against Louisbourg, tho' both of them had been appointed during the late administration. Had you found any exceptions to those appointments, you had full time to have altered them, because it was the 9th of July, before the sea and the land forces effected their junction at Hallifax; and it was not till above a month after, that the expedition was laid aside upon intelligence that 17 French ships of the line, laden with all kinds of military stores and ammunition, got into Louisbourg. I shall not pursue the detail of what followed, but only must observe, that on the 27th of July, 1758, we became masters of Louisbourg, by which the French were in fact cut off from their cod-fishery, and at the same time we destroyed the island of St. John's, and all their other stations on that coast; by which

which the French could land troops, so as to succour Canada; nay, their ships stole out of the river St. Laurence, and joined their squadron under Monsieur Bompard in the West-Indies.

Such, Sir, was the state of the war in America, during the year 1758, at a time, and in a country, when the most consummate impudence itself cannot pretend, that the operations in Germany had the smallest influence upon our conquests in America. When Boscawen took Louisbourg, the French were in full vigour on the continent of America. He sailed for Halifax on the 19th of February, 1758. He had under his command 151 ships, and the land troops amounted to 14,000 men, and the garrison, who were made prisoners of war, amounted to 5637. It is remarkable, that all this time, Canada received no kind of reinforcement or assistance from the French, tho' their squadron which returned from America to Brest carried 1474 guns.

While affairs were in this prosperous situation in America, the French neither

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attempted nor intended to succour Canada, or their settlements on the continent of America, which they thought were secure against all attacks, and our dispositions against Canada were such, as all the force of France in America could not have disappointed, considering the vast superiority of our naval force in those seas. But the truth is, the French had now in their eye an affair of greater importance than the defence even of Canada itself; and that was a descent upon Great Britain. By this time, however, the state of affairs in the cabinet portended a total alteration. Continental measures had got the ascendancy there; and you yourself, Sir, must have found it impracticable to persevere even in the practice of dissimulation. You threw off the mask at last, and after America was, in fact, subdued, you declared, that it could not be done without employing five and twenty thousand British troops upon the continent of Germany, and sinking above six millions of money yearly there. Let any one compare dates and facts, and there cannot be the least dispute

pute on that head. His Majesty, at opening the session of parliament, which began December the first, 1757, recommended as the great objects, which he had at heart, the preservation of the Protestant religion, and the liberties of Europe; and, in that view, to adhere to and encourage his allies, particularly the king of Prussia, who should be supported in such a manner as his magnanimity and active zeal deserve. By those expressions which followed his Prussian majesty's victory at Rosbach, it was plainly discoverable, that the German interest had now the ascendancy in the cabinet; and the supplies voted for the ensuing year to German troops and measures, amounted to one million eight hundred sixty one thousand eight hundred and ninety seven pounds, while the expences of our own war, and for defending ourselves, amounted to eight millions two hundred and eight thousand three hundred and seven pounds, besides four hundred and sixteen thousand pounds granted for deficiencies, repairs, &c. the total sum being, within a trifle, of

ten millions and an half. All this, Sir, was granted at a season when it was impossible for the French to have employed a single ship to save Canada, or their settlements on that continent, and when their whole attention was employed upon invading Great Britain. We had, at that time, above twenty five thousand of their most useful subjects and sailors prisoners here; and, excepting the ships and transports, which they intended to employ against this nation, it was not in their power to have carried over three hundred men to America. This observation holds equally strong with regard to the reduction of Guadaloupe and Martinico; for though, when the latter was reduced, they had laid aside their projects of invasion, yet it is well known, that their marine was then almost totally annihilated.

From this review, Sir, I hope your friends and you will be candid enough to acknowledge, First, that the immense expence of blood and treasure, which we poured out in Germany, neither did nor could, in the least degree, operate in America,

merica, farther than by diverting from it the troops and money that might have been more usefully employed there. Secondly, that you never did make the American war your primary object. And, thirdly, that the fear of losing your power in the cabinet, by a superior German interest, obliged you to pull off the mask, and to avow those measures which you had always secretly abetted ; but which you were now forced openly to pursue.

Such was the infatuation of the public in your favour, that some applauded, some pitied, and a few blamed, you. But, upon the whole, no abatement of your ministerial influence was sensibly perceived, for some time after the accession of his present Majesty ; and, perhaps, no minister ever had such fair play as you had from all parties. It was not, however, to be supposed, that, after all the purposes, or, at least, all the declared ones of our vast expence were answered, that we were to go on in the same ruinous track ; nor indeed, when the negotiation carried on by Mr. Stanley and Monsieur

sieur Bussy was opened, had your character suffered in the eye of the public. The gentlemen who had been the most averse to continental measures, would have winked at the futility of your apologies, and seemed willing to forget and forgive. But moderate measures were far from being your aim; and tho' conveniency obliged you to make two great concessions, those of giving up Guardaloupe, and allowing the French a liberty to fish on the banks of Newfoundland; yet you soon perceived, that you could not, at once, retain your power and your popularity. You saw, that it was merely in tenderness to the peace of the public, that you was indulged in the exercise of the former; and you began to perceive, that the other tottered through the concessions you had made.

Give me leave, Sir, to speak candidly. You know that you had no longer that radical influence which you possessed during the late administration, and rather than abandon it, you reverted to popularity even with some small inconsistency in your character, by pretending to be ashamed,

ed, and to repent of the concessions you had made. Every part of your conduct was suited now to court the populace. The foolish simple paper, for it could be called no other, which Buffy presented during the course of the negotiation, desiring that his Catholic Majesty's claims and interest might be consulted in it, gave you full room for displaying your patriotism, by treating both kings in a manner that perhaps never was heard of before, towards powers not absolutely reduced. And yet this haughtiness, rash and inconsiderate as it may seem, was the most politic measure you ever pursued. You were sensible, nor did you conceal it, that the courts of Madrid and Versailles were now in perfect good understanding with one another; and that this union must in the end, if not in the progress of it, break your power. You, therefore, consulted with yourself in what manner to make your bows, and to retire before you should be turned out. The family compact presented itself, and was, before the contents of it were known, represented
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by you as being big with such destruction to this kingdom, as to require an immediate declaration of war against Spain. You did not indeed venture to point out particulars; but you attempted to bring your fellow counsellors, as well as the public, into an implicit belief of your dictates. You was hampered in your own snare. Some ministers were in the cabinet, who were as well instructed as yourself in the mighty secret, and who knew that if there was the least danger in the family compact, it could arise only by your continuing in power, and by persevering in the absurdity of your conduct, and the insolence of your behaviour. They gave you line however, and without offering to pull the hook, you fairly dashed into a resignation; but upon what a ridiculous pretext, let any man judge who has read this boasted compact. In short, Sir, when you saw that you could no longer withstand the torrent that was ready to break upon you, you dived below it, and by the favour of a master who loved his people too well to endanger the peace of the public,

public, you was suffered to retire from business with most distinguishing marks of royal indulgence and bounty.

I shall just only mention the two pretexts which you made for your resignation. One was, that you was no longer suffered to guide the affairs of government; the other, that you differed from the rest of the council, with regard to the affairs of Spain. Who, Sir, that reads the first excuse can imagine you to have been any other than a vizir, to whom an indolent grand signior had remitted the reins of government; for the successful management of which you was answerable with your head? If future times should peruse such an apology, will it not be natural for the readers to ask; Whether Great Britain at that time was not governed by a prince who was in a state of insanity, infancy, or dotage? But to put the matter on a fair issue, I shall take the liberty to vindicate his Majesty and your fellow counsellors so far, as to call publickly upon you to know, what single measure you guided, in which the rest of the board had not, if

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they pleased to have exerted it, a negative? Many measures may occur in government, of so trifling importance, that it is not worth while to break the unity of a council board by any difference upon them. But it was very plain, that when an affair of importance occurred, you, Sir, was not suffered to dictate; but was controuled. It was then seen, that neither your Sovereign nor your fellow ministers were cyphers in the government; and had you not taken advantage of the very pause you seized, you perhaps could have had no pretext for using the word RESIGNATION.

As to the affairs of Spain, your boasted discovery of the family compact was a mere evasion. That compact is as harmless as any measure can be entered into amongst sovereigns, who are apprehensive of being obliged to receive the law from a haughty, overbearing, minister, without any other reason but the *sic volo*. It was then time, Sir, to shew the crown of Spain, that his Majesty was governed by principles of justice and moderation; that he

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was not to give way to a torrent of impetuous passion ; that you had at least equals in his cabinet, and by well judged experience, superior in his favour.

In the mean while, it is to be lamented, that you had so long time to sport with the passions of the people, by throwing out the baits of pernicious conquests, and unimportant victories. What purpose, Sir, can our acquisitions, were they ten times greater than they are, serve ? Were I to speak my own mind I think they must ruin us, in the same manner as a trader or shopkeeper is ruined by over-dealing himself. The very house and shop rent we pay must sink us in the end. Consider, Sir, that by a moderate estimate, every fifth (I had almost said) every fourth able-bodied man in Great Britain is either a soldier or a sailor in his Majesty's service. We have not in the united kingdoms seven millions of inhabitants. Of those, one half are women ; and of the remainder, I shall even admit one half to be capable of bearing arms. This, Sir, brings the number of fighting

men amongst us, to be about one million seven hundred and fifty thousand; which divided by five will answer to pretty near the number of men employed in the war.

I know, Sir, that some advantage may be taken of this estimate; because the number of sailors and soldiers do not rise so high. But give me leave to observe, that the paper kite tail is of a monstrous extent. The dependents upon war, such as transports, commissaries, sutlers, with a long train of *et ceteras*, are hardly to be estimated; and including workmen at a moderate computation, their numbers amount to very near one half of the real soldiers and sailors employed.

How long do you or your friends imagine, Sir, can a nation like this, which since the beginning of the present war has lost above one hundred and fifty thousand hands, continue to afford such an expence of blood? I will venture to say, not for two years, if our conquests should continue. Let a man, who has ever so little skill in figures, sit down with pen and ink, and calculate how many hands commerce,

merce, agriculture, and manufactures employ in this nation, he will find, that for five years past, we have not been able to supply the proper numbers, without raising the price of labour to so excessive a rate, as amounts almost to a prohibition in many branches of business. This is not all; there is scarcely a conquest we have made that is not at this very time possessed by our natural enemies. What must the case be, when those conquests come to be peopled, so as to render them of service to the mother country. Shall we unpeople England to make England; or, as the saying is, *are we to built London out of London.* Look round this nation, and let me ask any reasonable man, whether we can spare more men to the purposes, either of war or population? Should it be said that our enemies are equally distressed. I answer that is false. Their trade is indeed ruined, and their finances are exhausted. But they can lye by for as many years as we can do months; it is true private adventurers must be hurt, but the numbers of their fighting men are still undiminished,

diminished; and France, long before she had her West-India trade, was as powerful, I had almost said more so, as she is at present. Where was her foreign commerce under her Richelieus and Mazarines, or when Lewis the 14th filled every corner of Europe with terror and dismay? Colbert was the first minister that inspired her government with the notion of applying her marine to the extention of her colonies, and yet a right Frenchman is, at this very time, of opinion, that in so doing, Colbert mistook the true principles of French greatness. I shall not however enter into any discussion of that point. All that I would infer, is, that France within herself, by the advantages of her situation and climate, would be a great and powerful kingdom, tho' her commerce to the East and West Indies should not bring her in a shilling a year. In this she indisputably has an advantage over England. France could trade all over Europe, tho' she had not a ship of burden. Great Britain without shipping can have no trade, and scarcely any existence. We proceed on false and
frivolous

frivolous notions, when we talk of ruining the French by destroying their commerce. If we have commerce of our own, the French must, and always will have a share of it. What is commerce, but an intercourse of the commodities of life? If such an intercourse does not subsist, let us bring to our warehouses all the treasure and trade of the two Indies, and we must be ruined?

Supposing therefore, Sir, that this war should go on, and that we are successful in it to the utmost extent of our wishes, by stripping France of every foot she has in America. What must be the consequence, but a general combination against us of all the nations in Europe without regard to property or principles? Every port must be shut against us, and every people our foes. But it may be said, if the American and West-India trades are intirely our own, what must the rest of Europe do? Better perhaps than they do now. Distress and avarice will catch hold of private traders, and we shall soon become a nation of smugglers. This is a truth too wo-
fully

fully confirmed by experience. What has the Spaniards gained by monopolizing their gold? Have they not been reduced to consider it as a mere material, that is to be changed for other materials of more value and use in life? Should we monopolize the sugar and the fish trades, the case would be the same; our enemies would still be supplied with sugar, and fish by smugglers, at a cheaper rate than they could be by fair traders.

I am far, Sir, from pretending to be in the secret of the negotiation, I shall therefore take it upon the common footing, that we are to restore Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to grant the French a liberty of fishing and drying their fish on the banks of Newfoundland; while we are to have the cession of Louisiana, and the free navigation of the Mississippi. Now, Sir, without entering upon particulars, or a disagreeable detail of the vast expenses which our conquests and the war have occasioned, I shall put it to the breast of every man of honour and principle, whether, situated as this nation is at present,

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at war with the two greatest powers in Europe, the strength of the one almost undiminished, and that of the other daily recruiting, the difference between what you was willing to accept of, and what the French are willing to give, can create with any reasonable person an hour's hesitation, when put in ballance with the benefits of peace? That the complection of the war has of late changed in the favour of our enemy, seems by no means improbable, whatever the fate of the Havannah may be. To what, Sir, was that owing, but to your dragging Spain into a war, which every principle of interest and inclination directed her to avoid. With regard to our log-wood trade, she had made concessions, which no private gentleman, considering the whole of it is upon indulgence, could find fault with. As to the right of her subjects fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, she does not seem ever to have been in earnest. The advantages we have gained over France are sufficiently acknowledged, and are as honourable as they are advantageous; nor
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can they ever be frustrated but by our departing from the principles of justice and moderation, and by our forgetting the precept of one of the greatest men of antiquity, *to make a bridge of gold to a flying enemy.* I have the honour to be,


S I R,

Your most devoted humble Servant.


P. S. Our acquisition of the Havannah, the news of which arrived since this letter was finished, makes no manner of alteration in the general course of the reasoning contained in it, as the reader may easily see, that the whole is built on a supposition, that the place must sooner or later become ours.

F I N I S.









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